п÷п╬я─я┌п╟п╩ | п║п╬п╢п╣я─п╤п╟п╫п╦п╣ | п· п╫п╟я│ | п░п╡я┌п╬я─п╟п╪ | п²п╬п╡п╬я│я┌п╦ | п÷п╣я─п╡п╟я▐ п╢п╣я│я▐я┌п╨п╟ | п■п╦я│п╨я┐я│я│п╦п╬п╫п╫я▀п╧ п╨п╩я┐п╠ | п╖п╟я┌ п²п╟я┐я┤п╫я▀п╧ я└п╬я─я┐п╪ п÷п╣я─п╡п╟я▐ п╢п╣я│я▐я┌п╨п╟ "п═я┐я│я│п╨п╬пЁп╬ п©п╣я─п╣п©п╩п╣я┌п╟" п╒п╣п╪я▀ п╢п╫я▐:

п°п╦я─ я│п╬п╠п╦я─п╟п╣я┌я│я▐ п╬п╠я┼я▐п╡п╦я┌я▄ п╠п╣я│п©п╬п╩я▒я┌п╫я┐я▌ п╥п╬п╫я┐ п╡ п╫п╟я┬п╣п╧ Vselennoy! | п÷я─п╣п╥п╦п╢п╣п╫я┌я┐ п÷я┐я┌п╦п╫я┐ п╬ я│п╬п╥п╢п╟п╫п╦п╦ п≤п╫я│я┌п╦я┌я┐я┌п╟ п≤я│я┌п╬я─п╦п╦ п═я┐я│я│п╨п╬пЁп╬ п²п╟я─п╬п╢п╟. |п²п╟я│ п©п╬я│п╣я┌п╦п╩п╬ 40 п╪п╩п╫. я┤п╣п╩п╬п╡п╣п╨ | п╖п╣п╪ п╥п╟п╫п╦п╪п╟п╩п╦я│я▄ я─я┐я│я│п╨п╦п╣ 4000 п╩п╣я┌ п╫п╟п╥п╟п╢? | п п╬п╪я┐ п╢п╟п╡п╟я┌я▄ пЁя─п╟п╫я┌я▀ п╦п╩п╦ я│п╨п╬п╩я▄п╨п╬ п╡ п═п╬я│я│п╦п╦ п╪п╬п╩п╬п╢я▀я┘ я┐я┤п╣п╫я▀я┘?

MI> Книжка вышла:

David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus. The Red Army on the Eve of World War. University Press of Kansas, 1998, ISBN 0-7006-0879-6

Посвящена топтанию нашего друга, только не строчка за строчкой, а рисуя картину по документам и пр. как она видится на самом деле:

This book continues the essential process of examining the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the Soviet-German war by objectively studying the readiness state of the Red Army in summer 1941 on the basis of Soviet and German archival materials.

(см. также оглавление в конце сообщения).

Основной вывод:

As interesting, sensational, and salable as this new theory is, the ultimate question for any responsible historian must be, "To what extent is the new theory correct?" Most who support the theory of preemptive war assume that the Red Army was both powerful and ready for war in 1941. That assumption underlies their descriptions of Stalin's subsequent political, diplomatic, and military actions prior to the outbreak of war. This volume exploits both German and Soviet archival evidence to question that vital assumption, which, following the evidence, this book finds to be totally unfounded.

Оказывается, это не первая книга вызванная Резуном.

Труды симпозиума, организованного U.S.Army's Foreign Military Studies Office:

David M.Glantz, ed. The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front: 22 June - August 1941, London, Frank Cass, 1993.

Антология, опубликованная в Москве:

Г.А.Бордюкова, В.А.Hевежин, Готовил ли Сталин наступательную войну против Гитлера?, Москва, АИРО-ХХ век, 1995

Hо больше всего меня позабавило следующее место:

The rippling disruptive effects of Rezun's work can already be seen in continental Europe and, in particular, in the German and Russian historical community. Prominent German historians have embraced his theses, and the ensuing personal and legal arguments have torn the German historical community and venerable historical institutions apart. Even post-Soviet Russia has yielded fertile soil for Rezun's brand of revisionism. A new

Веселый враль Резун (каковым он, по-моему мнению является) заставил внес раскол и склоку в ряды уважаемых немецких научных учреждений -- я думаю, он катается от смеха.

Теперь, как обещано - оглавление:

List of Maps and Illustrations

Preface

"List of Abbreviations

ONE. RED ARMY FORCES

Size and Configuration

Actual Force Generation and Mobilization

Statistical Data

TWO. COMMAND AND CONTROL AND COMMAND PERSONNEL

The Continuing Purges

Command Cadre and Training

Key Command and Staff Personnel

Statistical Data

THREE. THE SOVIET SOLDIER

Stereotypes

Sources

The Evolving Official Image

The Emerging Human Dimension

FOUR. STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND MOBILIZATION

War and Strategic Deployment Planning on the Eve of War

Mobilization Planning

Mobilization and Strategic Deployment Prior to 22 June 1941

Statistical Data

FIVE. COMBAT READINESS: GROUND COMBAT FORCES

Ground Forces

Rifle Forces

Mechanized Forces

Cavalry

Airborne Forces (Air Assault)

Fortified Regions

Statistical Data

SIX. COMBAT READINESS: COMBAT SUPPORT AND REAR SERVICE FORCES

Artillery

Engineers

Signal Forces

Air Defense

Border Guards and NKVD Forces

Rear Services

Statistical Data

SEVEN. AIR FORCES

Structure, Equipment, and Command and Control

Personnel and Unit Training and Tactics

Readiness for War

Readiness in Practice

Statistical Data

EIGHT. STAVKA AND STRATEGIC RESERVES

Initial Reserves (June to 15 July 1941)

Subsequent Reserves (15 July to August 1941)

Mechanized Reserves

Support Forces

Statistical Data

NINE. RED ARMY INTELLIGENCE ON THE EVE OF WAR

Warning of War

On the Eve of Barbarossa

judgments on Soviet Intelligence in June 1941

Conclusions

Appendix A. Red Army Order of Battle, 22 June to I August 1941

Appendix B. Red Army 1941 Defense Plans

Appendix C. An Opponent's View: German Intelligence Assessments

Appendix D. Correlation of Forces on the German-Soviet Front

Notes

Bibliographical Essay and Selective Bibliography

Index

Maps and illustrations

MAPS

1. Field Forces in the Western Theater, June 1941

2. Soviet Mobilization, June to December 1941

3. The Shaposhnikov Plan, November 1938: Variant 1

4. The Shaposhnikov Plan, November 1938: Variant 2

5. The July 1940 Strategic Plan

7. The October 1940 Strategic Plan

8. Mechanized Corps Dispositions, 22 June 1941

9. Fortified Regions on the Soviet Western Frontiers, June 1941

ILLUSTRATIONS